OT Pentest Framework

The 11 Phases

The OT attack chain, phase by phase

Each phase covers what attackers are trying to do, the techniques they commonly use, and the question a defender should be asking. Real attacks don't always go in a straight line, but this order is how the framework, and the book, walk through it.

  1. 01Reconnaissance
  2. 02Initial Access
  3. 03Discovery & Collection
  4. 04Execution
  5. 05Lateral Movement
  6. 06Persistence
  7. 07Evasion
  8. 08Command & Control
  9. 09Inhibit Response Function
  10. 10Impair Process Control
  11. 11Impact
01

Reconnaissance

Learn the target before touching it.

Gather as much relevant information about the target environment as possible. The more relevant information you have, the better your chances of success. Reconnaissance can be active or passive. OSINT (open-source intelligence) is the purely passive form.

What attackers do

  • OSINT on the organization, its people, vendors and integrators
  • Internet search engines for exposed assets: Shodan, Censys, FOFA, ZoomEye
  • Generic search engines and Google dorks
  • Job postings, press releases and vendor case studies that reveal the control system stack

Ask yourself as a defender

What does the internet already say about our plant, our vendors and our remote access?

02

Initial Access

Get the first foothold.

How attackers get their first foothold on the OT network, often by starting in IT and moving across the IT/OT boundary.

What attackers do

  • Exploiting internet-facing assets
  • Vulnerable remote access services (VPNs, jump hosts, vendor remote access)
  • Wi-Fi and other wireless attacks
  • Social engineering: phishing, vishing, impersonation
  • Transitory cyber assets: laptops, USB drives, phones
  • Supply chain attacks that are brought into the environment

Ask yourself as a defender

Which paths into OT exist today, and which of them do we actually watch?

03

Discovery & Collection

Find the assets, then learn what they are.

Discovery identifies the presence of an asset on the network. Collection determines the specific characteristics of that asset, such as vendor, model, firmware and role in the process.

What attackers do

  • Logical network discovery and mapping MAC addresses to vendors
  • Passive collection by parsing OT protocols from captured traffic
  • Carefully controlled active collection: safe scanning and banner grabbing
  • Gathering PLC data and enumerating HMIs and engineering workstations
  • Understanding zones and conduits

Ask yourself as a defender

Could an attacker build a better asset inventory of our OT network than we have?

04

Execution

Influence the physical process.

Gain the ability to influence, manipulate or alter a physical process, using legitimate or unauthorized tools. Living off the land is essential in OT, and many OT/ICS assets have no anti-virus, EDR or event logging, or no one is watching them.

What attackers do

  • PowerShell scripts at the Windows command line
  • Malicious logic or firmware pushed with the vendor's own engineering software (for example TIA Portal, RSLogix, Click Programming)
  • Brute-forcing a SCADA web interface with a custom script
  • Writing coils and registers over an unauthenticated protocol such as Modbus

Ask yourself as a defender

If someone ran our own engineering software against our PLCs, would we know?

05

Lateral Movement

Move toward the targets that matter.

High-value targets include engineering workstations, data historians and Windows-based HMIs. The same Windows weaknesses found in IT apply in OT, and unauthenticated OT protocols can be used to read and write values.

What attackers do

  • SMB shares, Kerberoasting and password hashes
  • Abusing unauthenticated OT protocols to read and write values
  • Pivoting through dual-homed hosts and the IT/OT DMZ
  • Privilege escalation on Windows-based OT hosts

Ask yourself as a defender

How many hops is it from a user's laptop to an engineering workstation?

06

Persistence

Stay in after a reboot, or after defenders close one door.

How an attacker keeps access after a system reboots, or after defenders find and close one access path.

What attackers do

  • Backdoors on engineering workstations: reverse shells, TeamViewer, VNC and other remote control agents
  • Malicious logic uploaded to PLCs
  • Valid credentials and password hashes for legitimate accounts
  • Administrative control of firewalls, VPN appliances and other network gear
  • Malicious startup scripts, scheduled tasks and extra user accounts
  • Exploits placed in engineering project files (for example .ACD, .S7P, .XML)

Ask yourself as a defender

If we found the attacker today, how confident are we that we would get every foothold?

07

Evasion

Hide from the people watching.

How attackers hide their presence on the OT network from defenders and operators.

What attackers do

  • Modifying tags that are not displayed on the HMI
  • Inserting extra PLC code rather than overwriting existing blocks
  • Running vendor tools in the background where they can't be seen
  • Using engineering workstations when no one is present, such as outside normal working hours

Ask yourself as a defender

Would an operator notice a change that never shows up on the HMI screen?

08

Command & Control

Keep a line back to the operator.

How attackers communicate with and control the systems they have compromised inside the OT environment.

What attackers do

  • Abusing remote access tools already approved for vendors
  • Tunneling traffic through allowed protocols and the IT/OT DMZ
  • Using compromised network devices as relays

Ask yourself as a defender

Do we know what normal outbound traffic from OT looks like, and would we spot something new?

09

Inhibit Response Function

Stop the system from protecting itself.

Delay or stop a control system's ability to respond to unsafe or abnormal conditions. This requires extremely detailed knowledge of the environment, the process logic, the system architecture and its security design.

What attackers do

  • Disabling or silencing alarms
  • Preventing emergency stop functions
  • Overriding or disabling safety interlocks
  • Case study: TRISIS/Triton targeting a safety instrumented system

Ask yourself as a defender

Which of our safety and alarm functions could be changed from the network?

10

Impair Process Control

Manipulate the process itself.

Disrupt or manipulate the logic, parameters and commands that keep the physical process running as designed.

What attackers do

  • Changing setpoints and control parameters
  • Spoofing sensor and analyzer values so the reported value differs from reality
  • Unauthorized commands to field devices, as with FrostyGoop and Modbus in 2024

Ask yourself as a defender

If a sensor reading were spoofed, which of our processes would act on it?

11

Impact

The consequence in the physical world.

The outcome the attacker is after: loss of control, loss of view, damage to equipment, loss of production, or harm to people and the environment. This is why OT security exists.

What attackers do

  • Loss of view and loss of control
  • Damage to property and equipment
  • Loss of production and revenue
  • Safety and environmental consequences

Ask yourself as a defender

What is the worst credible outcome for each of our critical processes, and what stands in the way?

Lab only

Practice these techniques on your own lab equipment and simulators, never on production systems. The tools page has simulated PLCs built for exactly that.